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Universal service envisions that all consumers have access to communica-
tions services regardless of income or geographic location.' Two "core" justi-
fications include creating societal benefits and positive network externalities.2
In theory, society benefits from the greatest number of people using communi-
cations technologies because of the economic and societal advantages that ac-
crue to individuals who have access to communications technologies.3 Net-
work externalities occur when the value of a communications network as to its
individual users increases proportionally with the number of users.4 However,
the benefits justifying universal service ultimately come at a cost to consumers.
t J.D. and Communications Law Studies Certificate Candidate, May 2009, The Catho-
lic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
I Emily Dawson, Note, Universal Service High-Cost Subsidy Reform: Hindering Ca-
ble-Telephony and other Technological Advancements in Rural and Insular Regions, 53
FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 119 (2000). The phrase universal service "takes on different meanings
depending on the time and the place, and the particular policy debate." Michael H. Riordan,
Universal Residential Telephone Service, in I HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS Eco-
NOMICS: STRUCTURE, REGULATION AND COMPETITION 423, 424 (Martin E. Cave, Sumit K.
Majumdar & Ingo Vogelsang eds., 2002).
2 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., DIGITAL AGE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: PROPOSAL OF
THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE WORKING GROUP 6 (2005), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/books/051207daca-usf-2.0.pdf.
3 See id at 6-7. The economic and societal benefits include, among other things, "en-
hanced educational opportunities, improved medical care, widespread availability of infor-
mation, and increased economic competitiveness." Dawson, supra note 1, at 119; see also
Rob Frieden, Strategies for Repairing the Universal Service Fund 5, available at
www.benton.org/benton files/Frieden.doc (arguing that supporting universal service is
sound public policy precisely because of the societal externalities it confers, namely com-
merce, political discourse, education, and delivery of government services such as job train-
ing).
4 Generally, externalities are achieved when "one person's consumption of a good or
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A desirable universal service mechanism balances the system's costs to so-
ciety with the system's benefits to society.' The cost to society manifests in the
form of real costs to consumers and distortions in consumer's consumption
decisions.6 Thus cost stems from the requirement that telecommunications pro-
viders contribute to the Universal Service Fund ("USF" or "the Fund"), based
on a percentage of their interstate and international telecommunications reve-
nue.' This cost is ordinarily passed on to consumers as a line item on their
monthly bills, and is often referred to as a tax.' Generally taxes effect a con-
sumer's consumption decision with regard to that good or service, resulting in
a lower level of consumption with a tax than without.' Therefore, the cost in
terms of distortion in consumption arises from the operation of the tax.
Generating the funds to support universal service through taxing interstate
and international end user revenue is a relatively new policy." The effort to
service affects another person's well being." JOHN R. MEYER, ROBERT W. WILSON, M. ALAN
BAUGHCUM, ELLEN BURTON & Louis CAOUETTE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 103 n.3 (1980) (explaining externalities in the context of
pricing telecommunications services and the effect of external costs on consumption). Net-
work externalities refer to "any situation [in] which the value of a product depends on its
number of users." Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Con-
tracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 764 n. 16 (1995). For example, in a telecommunications network,
an externality is created by the addition of a new subscriber to the network, which "confers
a benefit on existing subscribers because of the number of ports that can now be reached is
increased." Lester D. Taylor, Customer Demand Analysis, in 1 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS ECONOMICS: STRUCTURE, REGULATION AND COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 98,
103. Some draw a distinction between network externalities and network effects with the
former "entail[ing] some form of inefficiency attributable to network characteristics." Mark
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 479, 483 n.5. Network effects "describe the situation of interdependent value,"
where the costs or benefits of participation in the network are internalized. Klausner, supra,
at 764 n. 16.
5 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 2; see also In re Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, T 55 (May 7, 1997)
[hereinafter Report and Order] (stating that the universal service principles established by
Congress in the 1996 Act inherently include the concept of "economic efficiency").
6 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING UNIVERSAL TELEPHONE SERVICE 19 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/61xx/doc6191/03-28-Telephone.pdf The distortions
originating from the tax charged to consumers of interstate telecommunications services,
voice over Internet protocol ("VolP"), or wireless services that fund universal service. See
47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2000).
7 47 U.S.C. § 254(d). Every quarter the Commission calculates a contribution factor to
determine what percentage of interstate end user revenue providers must contribute to USF.
47 C.F.R. § 54.706 (2006).
8 FCC CONSUMER FACTS: UNDERSTANDING YOUR TELEPHONE BILL 2 (2008),
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/understanding.html.
9 Riordan, supra note 1, at 434 ("Economists generally agree that universal service
policies that distort usage prices above incremental costs sacrifice economic efficiency.");
see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 19.
10 See 47 U.S.C. §254(d).
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achieve universal access to communications networks prior to the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") was achieved primarily through implicit
subsidies-internal revenue shifting within a single telecommunications pro-
vider." The system worked well for monopoly providers, but as competition
increased through the 1990's so too did the need for a more sustainable univer-
sal service mechanism.' 2 In the 1996 Act, Congress removed barriers to com-
petition in the telecommunications market. 3 It recognized the impact of a com-
petitive market on universal service, and, thus, mandated that the support
mechanism be explicit. 4
In response to the 1996 Act, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") was tasked with creating the new system. 5 The
Commission, with Congress's guidance and pro-competitive principles in
mind, adopted four universal service support mechanisms and a contribution
methodology to fund the universal service mechanisms. 16 In the years follow-
ing the creation of the Fund, total USF outlays steadily increased from $3.3
billion in fiscal year 1999" to over $6.6 billion in fiscal year 2006.18
The growth of the Fund led to concern regarding its long term viability.' 9
The high-cost fund-one of the four explicit support mechanisms created by
the Commission pursuant to the 1996 Act-is, to a large extent, responsible for
this growth. Outlays from the high-cost fund have grown from approximately
11 Report and Order, supra note 5, 10. Implicit subsidies were generally achieved
through three different means: geographic rate averaging; charging artificially higher prices
to business consumers; and charging higher prices for interstate services. Id 12; see also
infra Part III.B (discussing methods of implicit subsidization).
12 Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 398 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
Congress was concerned that competition would place an unsustainable burden of providing
universal service on incumbent providers).
13 H.R. REp. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the 1996 Act will de-
velop a framework to accelerate deployment of advanced telecommunications networks by
opening the market to competition).
14 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (establishing that universal service support be explicit); see also
In re Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers;
Transport Rate Structure and Pricing; End User Common Line Charge, First Report and
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, 9 (May 16, 1997) [hereinafter Access Charge Reform Report]
(justifying the Commission's decision to remove implicit subsidies in the form of access
charges over time on "Congress's directives" that support be explicit).
15 47 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2).
16 Report and Order, supra note 5, 18. For a discussion of the four support mecha-
nisms and contribution methodology, see infra Part IV.B.
17 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 4 tbl.1-1.
18 Universal Service Monitoring Report, CC Docket No. 98-202, at 1-36 tbl. 1.11 (Dec.
28, 2007).
19 See generally Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service Seeks Comment on
Long Term, Comprehensive High-Cost Universal Service Reform, Public Notice, 22
F.C.C.R. 9023, 1 (May 1, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Public Notice] (expressing the Joint
Board's concern over the "explosive growth" of high-cost universal service outlays).
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$2.6 billion in 2001 to over $4 billion in 2006.20 Consequently, the percentage
of interstate revenue that telecommunications providers are required to con-
tribute to USF (a cost passed on to consumers) has grown from an average of
6.85% in 2001 to an average of 10.7% in 2007.21 While some policy changes
have been undertaken to sustain the Fund, reform to achieve long-term sustain-
ability has not materialized. 2  Policymakers have recognized the current eco-
nomic failures of universal service,23 but are unable to reconcile the need for
reform with possible "principal-agent problems in which policymakers' per-
sonal long-term political objectives may foreclose pursuit of more socially
beneficial policy options."24
This Comment recommends general principles of reform for the high-cost
fund and contribution methodology that mitigate the political constraints facing
policymakers. Congress should adopt the recommended principles to aid the
Commission in creating a high-cost mechanism and contribution methodology
that better limit the costs of achieving universal service. Part II describes the
costs of universal service and the political achievability of reforms. Part III
discusses the historical treatment and evolution of universal service from mo-
nopoly market structure with implicit subsidies, to a competitive marketplace
with explicit subsidies. Part IV describes the principles of universal service and
the specific mechanisms adopted by the Commission. Part V examines the
failure of the universal service mechanism to minimize the costs and distor-
tions created by the provision of universal service, specifically with regard to
20 In re High-Cost Universal Service Support; Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, Recommended Decision, 22. F.C.C.R. 8998, 4 (Apr. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Rec-
ommended Decision].
21 See FCC, Universal Service Fund Contribution Factor & Quarterly Filings,
http://www.fcc.gov/omd/contribution-factor.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
22 For example, the Commission recently adopted an order requiring VoIP providers to
contribute to the USF. In re Universal Service Contribution Methodology; Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Streamlined Con-
tributor Reporting Requirements Associated with Administration of Telecommunications
Relay Service, North American Numbering Plan, Local Number Portability, and Universal
Service Support Mechanisms; Telecommunications Services for Individuals with Hearing
and Speech Disabilities, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; Administration of
the North American Numbering Plan and North American Numbering Plan Cost Recovery
Contribution Factor and Fund Size; Number Resource Optimization; Telephone Number
Portability; Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format; IP-Enabled Services, Report and Order
and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518, 34-38 (June 21, 2006).
23 See e.g., Recommended Decision, supra note 20, 1; In re High-Cost Universal Ser-
vice Support; Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 22 F.C.C.R. 9705 (May I1, 2007) (seeking comment on capping the high-cost support
in response to its extreme growth).
24 BARBARA A. CHERRY, ADDRESSING POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC
VIABILITY CONSTRAINTS To ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES IN THE




the costs of the high-cost fund and contribution methodology. Part VI recom-
mends two principles that will promote politically viable reform of high-cost
fund support and contribution methodology. This Comment concludes with an
application of these principles against current reform proposals.
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF REFORM
Universal service policies must balance the cost of the system with the bene-
fits derived from it.25 The determination of costs and benefits relies on eco-
nomic, social, and institutional factors.26 The cost of providing universal ser-
vice is the loss in consumer welfare due to the tax on interstate communica-
tions service. The benefits include network externalities27 and "enhanced edu-
cational opportunities, improved medical care, widespread availability of in-
formation, and increased economic competitiveness."2
In balancing these costs and benefits, policymakers must fulfill "the joint re-
quirements of political feasibility and economic viability."29 Policymakers
seeking to reform universal service face strong constituencies, such as rural
telephone companies, national telephone companies, and consumers.3" When
these forces "favor[] preservation of the existing arrangements," it is more po-
litically feasible to sustain current policies than to implement reform.3"
25 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 2.
26 See Johannes M. Bauer & Steven S. Wildman, Looking Backwards and Looking
Forwards in Contemplating the Next Rewrite of the Communications Act, 58 FED. COMM.
L.J. 415, 418 (2006) (describing the "design of law and policy" as an optimized "problem
subject to certain technological, economic, and institutional constraints" and providing an
objective function that can express societal preferences for traditional policy analysis based
on the aforementioned factors).
27 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 6.
28 Dawson, supra note 1, at 119.
29 CHERRY, supra note 24, at 1 ("Sustainable development of a nation's public utility
infrastructure, such as electricity and telecommunications, requires regulatory policies that
satisfy both political feasibility and the economic conditions for maintaining a financially
viable utility industry.").
30 See id. at 4. This is particularly true when "transitioning from a monopoly to a com-
petitive regulatory regime." Id. at 2 n.2; see also JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE,
COMPETITION 1N TELECOMMUNICATIONS 218 (2000) (identifying three categories of interest
groups affecting reform for utilities: consumers in rural areas seeking to maintain universal
service; large businesses users seeking lower prices through competition; and incumbent
operators seeking to maintain universal service).
31 Bauer &Wildman, supra note 26, at 418-19.
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A. Balancing Costs and Benefits
As the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") frames the cost-benefit bal-
ance, "[a] central question to be asked about any mechanism used to finance
federal spending is whether there is a way to collect the funds at a lower cost to
the economy."32 CBO further explains that the cost "hinges on the degree to
which a financing mechanism affects choices made by both producers and con-
sumers."" The cost of universal service falls primarily on consumers.
The cost is manifest in real terms-a line item on a consumer's bil134-as
well as distortions in consumption decisions." Consumption distortions exist
because altered prices affect consumer choice; "consumers will allocate their
spending differently than they would have in the absence of a tax."36 The size
of the distortion depends on two factors: (1) "the size of the tax;" and (2) "the
degree to which consumers reduce their purchases as a result of being forced to
pay the higher prices associated with the tax."3 The second factor refers to the
elasticity of demand for a service or good.3" The services affected by the USF
contribution requirements include long-distance telephone service, wireless
telephone service, and interconnected VoIP services.39 Unlike basic telephone
service, these services are subject to some elasticity on demand." Therefore,
32 CONG BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at xi. While universal service is technically
funded by industry, CBO explains that "[b]ecause those transfers between providers [the
contribution and distribution of USF support] are required by law, payments into and dis-
bursements from the Universal Service Fund are counted as revenues and outlays in the
federal budget." Id. at 1.
33 Id. at xi.
34 FCC CONSUMER FACTS: THE FCC's UNIVERSAL SERVICE SUPPORT MECHANISMS 1
(2008), http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/universalservice.pdf [hereinafter FCC UNI-
VERSAL SERVICE FACT SHEET].
35 Distortions in consumption decisions are just one piece of total effect on economic
efficiency. Riordan, supra note 1, at 434-36. Economic efficiency is achieved when the
price of a service is equal to the cost of providing one additional unit of that service, known
as the marginal cost of the service. When a universal service policy leads to prices that are
above marginal cost (as are prices that include a tax), the universal service policy "sacri-
fice[s] economic efficiency." Id. at 434. Other factors affecting economic efficiency are
producer surplus and deadweight loss (the efficiency loss from the tax). Id.; see also LAF-
FONT & TIROLE, supra note 30, at 222-23 ("[C]onsumption efficiency requires prices to be
equal to marginal cost.").
36 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 19.
37 Id.
38 id. Elasticity of demand is the effect of a change in price on demand for a particular
good or service. Some goods or services, such as basic telephone service, experience little
change in consumption for a given change in price. Id. at 19 n.2.
39 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.709(a) (2006).
40 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 19. "[T]he elasticity of demand for long-
distance calls is generally agreed to be around -0.7 whereas the elasticity of demand for
basic telephone access is thought to be closer to -0.02 or -0.03." Id. at 19 n.2. If the elasticity
is closer to zero, then the demand for that service is more inelastic. Therefore, the demand
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for a given increase in the price of one unit of these services, the level of con-
sumption of that service will decrease proportionally. It follows then, that as
the size of the tax grows, not only are consumers incurring the real cost of
maintaining the system, but they are also consuming less interstate telecom-
munications services than they would otherwise. In light of, or perhaps in spite
of these costs, universal service is justified on the benefits it confers.
Access to communications technologies brings increased economic, social,
and political opportunities to both rural and low-income citizens, in addition to
providing access to emergency services such as E-9 11.4 Furthermore, all con-
sumers benefit from increased productivity gains which are achieved through
"decreases in prices of transmission and increases in the amount of information
that can be cheaply and rapidly moved from place to place."42 Increasing pro-
ductivity gains benefit all consumers "through access to better products and
services and through lower prices.'"4 3 Increased access to communications
technologies may also result in positive network externalities.
Network externalities "exist[] where purchasers find a good more valuable
as additional purchasers buy the same good."' The telecommunications net-
work is "often characterized by 'network effects."' 45 In fact, the telecommuni-
for basic telephone service is relatively insensitive to changes in price. Even so, both VolP
and wireless telephony are presumably more sensitive to price than basic telephone service.
See id. at 19 (stating that cellular service is "more sensitive to price fluctuations than is basic
access").
41 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 6. Additional benefits of access to
communications technologies, not explicitly stated as a goal or purpose of universal service,
include: (1) "ensur[ing] that everyone has access to a telephone"; (2) "redistribut[ing] in-
come from rich to poor and from urban to rural telephone subscribers"; and (3) captur[ing]
the externalities from telecommunications in certain service sectors, such as education,
health care, and libraries." ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR
UNIVERSAL SERVICE? WHEN TELEPHONE SUBSIDIES BECOME TRANSPARENT 106 (2000); see
also LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 30, at 219 (identifying two rationales for universal ser-
vice: (1) "redistribution toward needy customers"; and (2) "regional planning attempting to
encourage a more harmonious distribution of residents away from large congested metro-
politan areas").
42 Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Communications Policy for 2006 and Beyond,
58 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 2 (2006). Hundt & Rosston cite productivity gains as the means for
achieving a key goal of communications policy, namely, "promot[ing] the welfare of our
citizens." Id. They further argue that "[t]he best means to achieve these goals of communi-
cations policy is to maximize the operations of markets." Id. They hedge their preference for
markets by citing two reasons that markets will not lead to optimal results. First, firms that
win in competitive markets seek to decrease competition. Second, regulators provide uni-
versal communications "in ways that diminish the responsiveness of the market as well as
the magnitude and speed of the introduction of new goods and services." Id.
43 Id.
44 Lemley & McGowan, supra note 4, at 483.
45 Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination
and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 283 (2006) (discussing network effects as they
relate to a "critical mass point" for the Internet). For a discussion of network externalities
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cations network is an "example of a 'pure' network, about which even skeptics
... concede that the network effects story has some validity."46 Theoretically,
as new users are added to the network, each existing user receives some mar-
ginal benefit.47 Justified by these benefits, universal service policy has sought
to maximize the number of people with access to communications technolo-
gies.
Universal service policy, however, does not equate the private benefit or
cost of achieving universal service with the cost and benefit to society.48 It
seeks "to extend the scope of the network farther, to the point at which, in
strictly economic terms, the marginal social cost of adding users may well ex-
ceed marginal social benefits. '49 The net economic welfare generated by uni-
versal service may be as much as negative $1.16 billion.5" Furthermore, esti-
mated total welfare gains that could be achieved by rate rebalancing-
estimates of the effects of moving from universal service to a cost-based pric-
ing regime-are $3 billion annually." Taking these figures at face value, the
balance appears to heavily favor the cost of universal service. To shift this bal-
ance, policymakers should adopt reforms targeted at the areas of the universal
service mechanism most responsible for creating the imbalance: the high-cost
fund and contribution methodology.
B. Political Feasibility of Reform
To achieve reform in any arena, policymakers need to fulfill the "joint re-
quirements of political feasibility and economic viability."52 For policy reforms
to be politically feasible, policymakers must recognize that an "economic vi-
ability problem ranks high on the policy agenda. 53 Once an economic viability
problem is recognized, policymakers must develop a political strategy that ac-
counts for perceived public opinion of reform, other politician approval for
and network effects see Lemley & McGowan, supra note 4.




50 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 9. The reduction in economic welfare
is comprised of a $240 million increase in the cost of interstate long-distance due to the
universal service contribution, and a $920 million reduction in producer welfare. Id.
5' CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 41, at 109-19. The purpose of rate rebalancing
in Crandall and Waverman's calculation is to approximate what rates would be without
universal service. The $3 billion annual welfare gain is arrived at by applying the Commis-
sion's Hybrid Cost Proxy Model. Two other models, the Benchmark Cost Proxy Model and
Common-Input model, yielded maximum welfare gains of $7 billion and $4.1 billion re-
spectively. Id. at 119.
52 CHERRY, supra note 24, at 1.
53 Id. at 14.
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reform, and political forces in support or opposition of reform.54 These "com-
ponents are considered in light of policymakers' own political objectives, often
posing principle-agent problems in which policymakers' personal long-term
political objectives may foreclose pursuit of more socially beneficial policy
options."5
The principal-agent constraint on policymakers appears to be powerful with
respect to telecommunications reform. For example, Representative Joe Barton
(R-TX), current Ranking Member of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, suggested "that it is 'debatable' whether the government should
subsidize telephone service for those living in remote areas."56 Despite this
remark, Rep. Barton conceded that "no such debate would take place in the
legislative arena because 'political realities' demand that universal service sub-
sidies continue for the foreseeable future."57 The "political realities" Rep. Bar-
ton spoke of seem to imply recognition of the political viability problem he
faces in seeking reform."
Reforming universal service is not a task exclusively belonging to Congress;
the FCC created the current USF mechanism and has periodically made re-
forms. 9 Decision makers at the Commission are subject to the same political
constraints as members of Congress, but with arguably less force.6" However,
the Commission historically has been slow to act on universal service issues.'
54 Id. at 14-15.
55 Id. at 15. For instance, Cherry discusses the difficulties policymakers face in account-
ing for their own goals, in light of their constituents' negative responses to any actual or
perceived losses. Id.
56 PHILIP WEISER, REPORT FROM CENTER FOR THE NEW WEST CONFERENCE ON UNIVER-
SAL SERVICE 1-2 (2005), available at
http://www.centerfomewwest.org/pdf/telecompolicy/FinalReport042205.pdf.
57 Id. at 2.
58 Representatives Lee Terry (R-NE) and Rick Boucher (D-VA) introduced the Univer-
sal Service Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 2054. While the bill had twenty-six co-sponsors as of
December 2007, it is still subject to broader political viability. At a USF conference, Rep.
Terry conceded that telecommunications is not a priority of Congress in 2007 and that
"[t]his is the year of global warming, so there is little likelihood of the bill coming out of
committee." Edie Herman, FCC May Vote Soon on Interim USF Cap Proposal, Says Tate,
COMM. DAILY, Oct. 2, 2007.
59 See e.g., Report and Order, supra note 5, 2 (creating the four USF support mecha-
nism and contribution methodology); In re High-Cost Universal Service Support, Federal-
State Joint Board on Universal Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 9705,
1 (May 11, 2007) (seeking comment on capping the high-cost support fund).
60 Because FCC commissioners are not directly elected by the public, the constraints
imposed by public interest groups and industry may be weaker than those imposed on legis-
lators, who are elected directly by these constituencies. See 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000) (pro-
viding that the FCC "shall be composed of five commissioners, appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.").
61 See e.g., infra Part IV.A (explaining that while in 2005 the Tenth Circuit held that the
Commission must define "sufficient" as it appears in section 254, the Commission has yet to
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Furthermore, FCC Chairman Kevin Martin has "'indicated a preference' for
Congress to... take the first step on revamping USF," perhaps in light of these
constraints.62
To a large extent, the constraint preventing policymakers from enacting sig-
nificant universal service reform originates with rural local exchange carriers
("LECs"). Rural LECs receive as much as one-third of their revenue through
USF under the current universal service mechanism. 63 For Congress, reforming
universal service in a manner that expressly eliminates this revenue stream is
neither economically viable nor politically feasible. 6 The relationship between
rural LECs and legislators has been described as a "textbook example" of a
program where the "special interest control of public policy tends to be strong
when the benefits of a program are concentrated on a small number of benefi-
ciaries while the costs are widely diffused. 65 Ultimately, the failure to reform
is a result of a failure of broader societal or economic interests to win over the
political interests of policymakers or incumbent economic interests of their
constituencies.
To understand how universal service, in particular the high-cost fund, has
become a multi-billion dollar subsidy program, and the nature of the balance of
costs, benefits, and politics, it is helpful to start at the genesis of universal ser-
vice.
III. UNIVERSAL SERVICE PRIOR TO THE 1996 ACT: IMPLICIT
SUBSIDIZATION AND MARKET DISTORTIONS
As early as the passage of the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"),
Congress sought to achieve universal access to communications services.66 The
define the term).
62 Herman, supra note 58.
63 THOMAS W. HAZLETT, "UNIVERSAL SERVICE" TELEPHONE SUBSIDIES: WHAT DOES $7
BILLION Buy? 56-57 (2006), available at
http://www.senior.org/Documents/USF.Master.6.13.06.pdf. Furthermore, on average, rural
LECs receive more than fifty percent of their sales revenue from government subsidies. Id.
at 57.
64 See id. at 56-58. Hazlett explains that the concentration of beneficiaries is exempli-
fied through the high-cost fund. On average, national high-cost fund support recipients re-
ceive $12 per person per year. In largely rural states the average subsidy is significantly
larger. For example, Alaskan carriers receive as much as $177 per person per year in high-
cost fund support. These constituencies are particularly strong in the Senate. Opposing this
small organized constituency is a "broad, general interest congruent with those of consum-
ers who pay taxes funding these transfers, [who are] not sufficiently well organized to de-
fend its interests." Id. at 58.
65 Id. at 56 (arguing that this situation allows "those who gain to successfully organize
and to influence government policy").
66 Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 266 (1997).
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1934 Act required the FCC to adopt regulations that "make available, so far as
possible, to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide ...
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges."67 The concept of universal service, however, pre-dated Congress'
implicit recognition in the 1934 Act.68
A. American Telephone and Telegraph's "Universal" Service
Prior to the 1934 Act, the term "universal service" may have had a different
connotation than it has taken on in the present day. The term originated around
1907 as a strategic goal of American Telephone and Telegraph ("AT&T").69
The goal of universal service was to connect all "localities and telephone users
into a single nationally interconnected system.70
While this goal does not appear to be a benevolent social contract to provide
service to all consumers, 7' commenters continue to disagree on AT&T's origi-
nal intentions for universal service.7 1 Some argue that the idea was a justifica-
tion for monopoly power, while others posit that AT&T had better intentions,
namely, to provide affordable access to all consumers.
Whatever the motive may have been, AT&T ultimately achieved market
dominance by connecting all "localities and telephone users into a single na-
tionally interconnected system. 7 4 In 1907, the Bell Telephone Company-the
original local exchange of which AT&T was the long distance subsidiary-
"reorganized" into AT&T. 75 At the time the companies merged, they controlled
67 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064.
68 See Meyerson, supra note 66, at 266.
69 THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 349, 350-51
(2d ed. 1998); see also Thomas M. Lynch, Telephony, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
HANDBOOK: A COMPLETE REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS 9, 40-41 (Leon T. Knauer, Thomas M.
Lynch, Ronald K. Machtley eds., 1996) (stating that the term "universal service" was intro-
duced in 1908).
70 KRATrENMAKER, supra note 69, at 350 (explaining that Theodore Vail, President of
AT&T, conceived the plan early in the twentieth century after observing the segmentation of
the telecommunications market in the late 1800's).
71 Id. at 350 (arguing that Vail did not intend for "universal service" to refer to subsi-
dized prices).
72 See PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 5-6. It seems that AT&T's own
interpretation of Vail's intention has changed depending on its needs. For instance, the in-
terpretation that universal service as a company policy was meant to provide affordable
access was attractive when antitrust pressures were applied to AT&T. See CRANDALL &
WAVERMAN, supra note 51, at 7-9.
73 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 5-6.
74 KRATTENMAKER, supra note 69, at 350.
75 Lynch, supra note 69, at 11. During this period AT&T was under government scru-
tiny for their anti-competitive business practices. In 1912, AT&T agreed to stop buying
competitors and allow independent local exchanges to connect to their long-distance net-
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only half of the local exchanges; independent phone companies controlled the
remaining half. 76
Subsequently, AT&T quickly vertically integrated its businesses, including
Western Electric, an equipment manufacturer, while simultaneously denying
interconnection of independent phone companies to AT&T's superior long
distance exchange." As a result of integration, by the end of World War II,
AT&T owned and operated all long distance lines and approximately eighty
percent of local lines."8
Due to AT&T's significant market power, the FCC's regulations directly
impacted the company's business. In fulfilling the duty to provide service to
everyone in the United States at reasonable rates,79 AT&T used a system of
implicit or cross-subsidies.8"
B. Methods of Implicit Subsidization
The Commission described implicit subsidization as occurring when a single
company receives revenue above cost for one service while simultaneously
pricing other services "allegedly" below costs.8 ' In 1997, at the time the Com-
mission adopted its first Report and Order, it noted the existence of three im-
plicit subsidies: geographic rate averaging; inflated rates for businesses; and
inflated rates for interstate long distance service. 2
First, implicit subsidization occurred through "geographic rate averaging."83
It is less expensive for a telecommunications service provider to build a net-
work and offer service in urban areas than in rural areas. " As a result, by
charging rates significantly above costs in urban areas, service providers were
work. However, by World War I, the government removed these restrictions to permit the
"establishment of a ubiquitous and efficient telephone network." Id. at 12-13.
76 Id. at 11.
77 Id. at 12.
78 KRATrENMAKER, supra note 69, at 348. This degree of market control allowed AT&T
to earn over $3 billion in revenue in 1950. MEYER ETAL.,supra note 4, at 4 tbl.l-1.
79 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
80 Report and Order, supra note 5, 10-12. The system of cross-subsidies operated as
"part of the regulatory contract between the firm and the regulator." LAFFONT & TIROLE,
supra note 30, at 217.
81 Report and Order, supra note 5, at 8784 n. 15.
82 Id. 12. Krattenmaker suggests that four implicit subsidy mechanisms existed, the
fourth being the cross-subsidization of highly used lines for lightly used lines. Under this
system, the cost-per-call on a given line is inversely related to the number of calls. There-
fore, the higher the number of calls, the lower the cost of each call to the service provider.
Maintaining artificially higher rates in high-call lines allowed for similarly priced calls on
lightly used lines. KRATTENMAKER, supra note 69, at 350.
83 Report and Order, supra note 5, 11. Geographic rate averaging was achieved by




able to offer "reasonable" rates in rural areas.85 The second method of implicit
subsidization stems from this premise.
Under the second method, businesses were charged higher rates than resi-
dential consumers even though the cost of providing service to each was effec-
tively equivalent.86 Residential rates were further subsidized by rates charged
to businesses for "vertical services such as touch tone, conference calling and
speed dialing."87
The third implicit subsidy was derived from interstate long distance
charges.88 Inflated usage charges for interstate customers were used to subsi-
dize the cost of local service. 9 While some forms of these implicit subsidies
still exist today, they are not the primary means by which the provision of uni-
versal service is achieved.9"
The implicit subsidy system for achieving universal service relied on a lack
of competition; as shown, implicit subsidies rely on the ability to inflate prices
along subsets of consumers within a single provider.9' While implicit subsidies
were meant to promote telephone subscribership, "they [did] so at the expense
of deterring or distorting competition."92 Implicit subsidies also had the effect
of "obscur[ing] the cost of the universal service mission" to the extent that
consumers were unable to modulate their consumption of services because
they did not know the level of their individual contribution to the subsidy
was. 
93
85 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
86 Report and Order, supra note 5, 11.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. The current USF contribution methodology still uses interstate and international
service as the basis for a carrier's contribution to the Fund. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.706 (2006).
90 For instance, telecommunications providers charge higher rates to business consum-
ers than to residential consumers, even though the cost of providing service may be con-
stant. Further, LECs still receive access charges, fees paid to LECs by long distance provid-
ers seeking access to the LECs customers. See HAZLETT, supra note 63, at 16-17.
91 Because most of the cross-subsidies relied on providing both interstate and intrastate
services, providers that served only interstate customers or only intrastate customers were
limited in their ability to cross-subsidize. Report and Order, supra note 5, 10-12 (ex-
plaining that implicit subsidies occur when a single company receives revenue above cost,
while simultaneously pricing other services "allegedly" below cost).
92 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 5 (Aug. 1, 1996).
93 See Frieden, supra note 3, at 6-7 (explaining that obscuring the cost of universal ser-
vice also caused other market distortions); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at
xi (explaining the effect on consumption decisions as consumers losing not only the value of
the fee, but also the benefits from the goods they did not consume because of the fee). It
should be noted that consumers who benefit from the subsidy make distorted consumption
decisions as well; however, this distortion is implicit in the idea of providing service at
comparable rates to all consumers regardless of geographic location. See 47 U.S.C. §
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Because implicit subsidization relied on the ability to price discriminate
across services and groups of consumers, it was best achieved in a monopoly
environment. With competition in local markets, an incumbent LEC could no
longer use rates in low-cost portions of their service area to subsidize the rates
in high-cost areas.94 Competitors providing service only in the low-cost areas
(urban areas) would price their service closer to their costs, undercutting the
incumbent LEC, and forcing price competition in these areas.95
Congress, recognizing the inability of an implicit subsidization to function
in a competitive environment and as part of the pro-competitive framework of
the 1996 Act, mandated that the universal service mechanism be explicit.96
While it may be argued that Congress managed the political constraints im-
posed by LECs and rural LECs by effectively protecting them as the likely
(and ultimate) beneficiaries of the new universal service mechanism, the intru-
sion on service providers' pricing structures and forcing local competition was
significant reform. Congress ultimately left the Commission the task of deter-
mining the specifics of the mechanism, further mitigating the political con-
straints by not directly harming any constituency.97 To guide the Commission
in establishing an explicit mechanism, Congress adopted a broad definition of
universal service and principles that the mechanism should satisfy.98
IV. THE 1996 ACT: UNIVERSAL SERVICE DEFINITION, PRINCIPLES,
SUPPORT MECHANISMS, AND CONTRIBUTION METHODOLOGY
Following an unsuccessful attempt by the previous Congress to enact broad
telecom reform, the 104th Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of
1996."9 The 1996 Act was intended to promote competition in the once mo-
254(b)(1)-(3) (2000); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the distorting effects of a tax on
consumption).
94 HAZLETT, supra note 63. This is especially true for implicit subsidization occurring
within a single provider. Id. at 16-17.
95 Qwest Commc'ns Int'l v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
Congress was concerned that price competition would leave the "former monopoly carriers
the unsustainable burden of providing service to rural areas in the face of a dwindling urban
base"); see also HAZLETT, supra note 63, at 13 (explaining that traditional sources of profit
for local LECs would disappear with competitive entry, thereby prohibiting incumbent
LEC's from "internally subsidizing users in high-cost areas").
96 47 U.S.C. § 254(e).
97 Congress, to an arguably lesser extent, also mitigated political constraints imposed by
LECs and rural LECs by leaving in place a system of access charges. See HAZLETT, supra
note 63, at 56-57. Rural LECs receive approximately ten percent of their revenue from in-
terstate access charges and sixteen percent from intrastate access charges. Id at 57 fig.9.
98 Report and Order, supra note 5, 2.
99 Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see also William H. Boger, Legislative History
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT HANDBOOK: A COM-
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nopolized local telephone market, specifically to "provide for a pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and infor-
mation technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommu-
nications markets to competition."'0 ° To achieve deployment in rural and high
cost areas, Congress adopted principles of universal service under which the
Commission was to adopt a specific mechanism.
A. Definition and Principles of Universal Service
Although Congress first codified universal service in the 1996 Act, the
phrase was not defined in the legislation.0°' Within the goal of "establish[ing]
rules and procedures for the reform of universal service in a competitive mar-
ket,' ' °2 Congress sought to guide the FCC "in implementing 'policies for the
preservation and advancement of universal service."" 3 Specifically, the 1996
Act established that "[u]niversal service is an evolving level of telecommuni-
cations services that the Commission shall establish periodically .. . taking into
account advances in telecommunications and information technologies and
services.""
The 1996 Act also created the Federal-State Joint Board to consult the
Commission on creating the mechanism and crafting reform.0 5 To determine
what services should be supported by the universal service fund, the Joint
Board and Commission must consider to what extent the services:
PLETE REFERENCE FOR BusINESS, supra note 74, at 1, 1-8 (explaining that there was signifi-
cant opposition to some unbundling requirements in S. 1822, the communications reform
bill debated in the 103rd Congress, which led to a threatened filibuster by then Minority
Leader Robert Dole (R-KS), and to the death of the bill before the end of the term).
100 Report and Order, supra note 5, 2; H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.);
see also James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2004) (The 1996 Act "was designed to 'fundamentally restruc-
ture[]' local telecommunications-replacing long-monopolized markets with vigorous com-
petition" and has "yielded more legal battles than competition.").
'o' See 47 U.S.C. § 254(c). Although this section is titled "Definition," the statute does
not provide an explicit definition. Instead, like much of section 254, Congress adopted gen-
eral guidelines of what constitutes universal service. Id.
102 KRATFENMAKER, supra note 69, at 464.
103 Qwest Commc'ns Int'l v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 47
U.S.C. § 254(b)).
104 47 U.S.C. § 254(c).
105 Id. § 254(a). The Joint Board is comprised of FCC Commissioners, state and local
regulatory utility commissioners, and a consumer advocate representative. FCC, Federal-
State Joint Board on Universal Service,




[A]re essential to education, public health, or public safety; have, through the opera-
tion of market choices by customer, been subscribed to by a substantial majority of
residential customers; are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by
telecommunications carriers; and are consistent with the public interest, convenience,
and necessity.'o6
In adopting the current universal service mechanism, the Commission deter-
mined, pursuant to a recommendation by the Joint Board, that while all of the
above factors must be considered in defining what services are supported, they
all need not be met."7 In a similar manner, Congress took an instructive ap-
proach with the adoption of the principles under which the Fund would oper-
ate.
The 1996 Act directs the Joint Board and Commission "to base policies for
the preservation and advancement of universal service" on several principles.'08
These principles fall into the general categories of consumer expectations, the
support mechanism (contribution methodology), and treatment of schools, li-
braries, and health care providers.'09
It is not entirely clear whether a universal service mechanism must meet all
of the principles or the meaning of the terms of the principles. These issues
were addressed in Qwest Corporation v. FCC ("Qwest T')."
0
The controversy in Qwest I arose out of a Commission order adopting a
high-cost support mechanism for non-rural eligible telecommunications carri-
ers ("ETCs") based on forward-looking economic costs."' The Tenth Circuit
determined that the Commission did not "define adequately key terms includ-
ing 'reasonably comparable' and 'sufficient.""' 2 With regard to whether a USF
106 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1)(A)-(D).
107 Report and Order, supra note 5, 55.
108 47 U.S.C. § 254(b).
109 Angela J. Campbell, Universal Service Provision: The "Ugly Duckling" of the 1996
Act, 29 CONN. L. REv. 187, 194-200 (1996). The adopted principles require that: (1) quality
services be available at reasonable rates; (2) access to advanced services and information
services "be provided throughout the United States;" (3) consumers in high-cost, rural, and
insular areas "have access to telecommunications and information services; (4) service pro-
viders make equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions to the preservation and ad-
vancement of universal service; (5) support mechanism be sufficient, specific, and predict-
able; and (6) schools, libraries, and rural healthcare providers have access to advanced ser-
vices. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b). Congress also allowed the Commission to adopt any additional
principles that the Joint Board and Commission "determine are necessary and appropriate
for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity .... Id. The Commis-
sion and Joint Board exercised this authority and adopted an additional principle, that uni-
versal service be guided by "competitive neutrality." Report and Order, supra note 6, 49.
lb0 Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2001).
11l See In re Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service, Ninth Report & Order and
Eighteenth Order on Reconsideration, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,432 (Oct. 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Ninth Report & Order].
112 Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1201. These terms are found within the six USF principles. See 47
U.S.C. § 254(b). The Commission had to demonstrate how the universal service mechanism
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mechanism must meet all of the principles in section 254, the court found that
"[t]he FCC may balance the principles against one another, but must work to
achieve each one unless there is a direct conflict between it and either another
listed principle or some other obligation or limitation on the FCC's author-
ity."' 3 Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the Commission's ac-
tion. "'
Upon reconsideration by the Commission, the Order on Remand. 5 was
challenged in Qwest Communications v. FCC ("Qwest If") for failing to "suffi-
ciently" satisfy the principles of section 254, among other things." 6 The Com-
mission argued that the forward-looking support mechanism sufficiently
achieved comparable rates for urban and rural consumers, and therefore satis-
fied section 254. In other words, the Commission argued sufficiency was the
only principle of section 254 that a mechanism must meet."7 The Commission
reasoned that because the "purpose of [the federal non-rural high-cost support]
mechanism is to provide enough federal support to enable states to achieve the
reasonable comparability of rural and urban rates," it was the only principle
that a USF support mechanism must sufficiently satisfy.'
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit found the Commission could not satisfy one
principle of section 254(b) in place of all others and the Commission must, at a
minimum, demonstrate that its decision "takes into account the full range of
principles Congress dictated to guide the Commission in its actions.""9 The
court ordered that the Commission "articulate a definition of 'sufficient' that
appropriately considers the range of principles identified in the text of the stat-
ute."' 2' To date, the Commission has failed to articulate the definition of"suf-
ficient."
met these terms. It follows that without an adequate definition of the terms, it cannot be
determined whether an action taken under section 254 meets the principles. The court also
found that the Ninth Report and Order "did not sufficiently justify setting the funding
benchmark at 135% of the national average;" did not provide "any inducements for the state
mechanism;" and did not "explain how this funding mechanism will interact with other
universal service programs." Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1201.
113 Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1199-1200.
114 Id. at 1205.
115 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Order on Remand, Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R.
22,559, 7 (Oct. 16, 2003).
116 Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2005).
117 Id. at 1234.
118 Id. at 1233-34.




B. The Four Support Mechanisms and Contribution Methodology
In its Report and Order, the Commission adopted four universal service
support mechanisms and a contribution methodology.' 2 ' The four support
mechanisms include support for areas with high-cost of deployment, support
for low income consumers, support for schools and libraries, and support for
rural healthcare providers.
1. High-Cost Support
The high-cost fund provides support to service providers in rural, insular,
and high-cost areas. Support is distributed to entities that qualify as ETCs.'22
Initially, all ETCs received support based on their embedded costs,'23 regard-
less of whether they served a rural or non-rural area. 24
Upon adoption of its Report and Order, the Commission noted that deter-
mining support by forward-looking economic costs rather than by using em-
bedded costs would force recipients of support to operate more efficiently.'25
Nonetheless, practical barriers to implementation at the time prohibited the
Commission from adopting a forward-looking cost mechanism.'2 6
Ultimately, the Commission adopted a forward-looking cost mechanism for
non-rural supported providers in its Ninth Report and Order.'27 To determine
support based on forward-looking economic costs, the Commission uses his-
torical cost data from an individual carrier as an input in an economic cost
model; the output is the carrier's forward-looking cost.'28 The order adopting
121 See Report and Order, supra note 5, 19 (creating the universal service fund pursu-
ant to the 1996 Act).
122 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1)-(2) (2000). An ETC shall, for the entire service area for which
they receive support:
(A) offer the services that are supported by Federal universal service support mecha-
nisms under section 254(c) of this title, either using its own facilities or a combination
of its own facilities and resale of another carrier's services (including the services of-
fered by another eligible telecommunications carrier); and
(B) advertise the availability of such services and the charges therefor [sic] using media
of general distribution.
Id. § 214(e)(1)(A)-(B). State commissions have jurisdiction over granting ETC status, and
may designate more than one per area. Id. § 214(e)(2); see also 47 C.F.R. § 54.202 (2006)
(establishing additional requirements for ETCs).
123 Embedded costs "refers to a carrier's historic loop or switching costs." Report and
Order, supra note 5, at 8900 n. 580.
124 Id. 6 (The Commission will "provide universal service support to carriers serving
rural, insular, and high-cost areas through a mechanism based on forward-looking economic
cost beginning on January 1, 1999, for areas served by non-rural LECs"). Id. at 8900 n.580.
125 Id. 228.
126 Id. 203.
127 Ninth Report and Order, supra note 111, 6.
128 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.309 (2006).
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this forward-looking cost mechanism for non-rural carriers was challenged and
remanded in Qwest I, and again remanded in Qwest II, after modification by
the Commission.'29 Non-rural carriers currently receive support based on for-
ward-looking economic costs; rural carriers still receive support based on their
historical embedded costs.' Competitive ETCs receive high-cost support
through the "identical support" rule, in which competitive ETCs receive the
same per-line support as incumbent ETCs, regardless of any disparity in
costs. '
2. Low Income
The Commission adopted the low income support mechanism pursuant to
the 1996 Act, which requires the Commission to adopt rules and regulations
that allow consumers in all areas of the country to access telecommunications
and information services at reasonable rates.'32 To receive support from the low
income mechanism, consumers must participate in at least one of several fed-
eral support programs, such as Medicaid or Food Stamps, or earn income of
135% or more below the Federal Poverty Guidelines.'3 3 This program distrib-
uted approximately $820 million in 2006.'
129 See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191, 1205 (10th Cir. 2001); Qwest Commc'ns
Int'l Inc. v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222, 1239 (10th Cir. 2005). Rural carriers are, generally, those
carriers that serve fewer than fifty thousand access lines. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 (2006).
130 Rural carriers are, generally, those carriers that serve fewer than 50,000 access lines.
See 47 C.F.R. § 51.5. To determine the feasibility of creating a forward-looking economic
cost mechanism for rural carriers, the Commission established a Rural Task Force. In 2001,
the Rural Task Force recommended a five-year plan under which support based on embed-
ded costs would continue. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; Multi-
Association Group (MAG) Plan for Regulation of Interstate Services of Non-Price Cap In-
cumbent Local Exchange Carriers and Interexchange Carriers, Fourteenth Report and Or-
der, Twenty-Second Order on Reconsideration, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in CC Docket No. 96-45, and Report and Order in CC Docket No. 00-256, 16 F.C.C.R.
11,244, 6 (May 10, 2001). The five-year period expired on June 30, 2006, and to date the
Commission has not adopted a forward-looking mechanism for rural carriers.
131 47 C.F.R. § 54.307(a)(1) (2006). Competitive ETCs receive support for new and cap-
tured subscriber lines in an incumbent rural ETCs service area "based on the support the
incumbent LEC would receive for each such line." Id.
132 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1) (2000) (establishing that "[q]uality service should be available
at just, reasonable, and affordable rates").
133 47 C.F.R. § 54.409(6) (2006); see also In re Lifeline and Link Up, Report and Order
and Further Notice of Proposal Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 8302, 10 (Apr. 2, 2004).
134 Universal Service Monitoring Report, supra note 18, at 1-36 tbl. 1.11.
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3. Rural Health Care
In the 1996 Act, Congress mandated that telecommunications carriers shall
"provide telecommunications services which are necessary for the provision of
health care services in a State ... to any public or nonprofit health care pro-
vider that serves persons who reside in rural areas."' 35 Like high-cost support,
the goal of this program is to achieve reasonably comparable rates for similar
services in rural and urban areas. 3 6 Unlike the high-cost fund, however, the
Commission determined that in order for the mechanism to be "specific, pre-
dictable, and sufficient," support for rural health care providers must be capped
at $400 million annually." 7
In an effort to adapt the rural health care program to changing technology
and needs of healthcare providers in rural areas, the Commission adopted a
rural health care pilot program in September 2006.38 The pilot program will
"provide funding to support the construction of state or regional broadband
networks and services provided over those networks."' 39 The goal of the pilot
program is to bring the benefits of telehealth 4 ° and telemedicine to "those ar-
eas of the country where the need for those benefits is most acute," through the
use of advanced broadband networks. '
4'
4. Schools and Libraries
The 1996 Act also provided support for the first time to schools and librar-
ies. 42 Congress specifically mandated that telecommunications "provide such
services to elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries for educational
purposes."'' 43 Unlike the high-cost fund and rural healthcare support, however,
Congress required that these institutions receive discounts such that their rates
are lower than rates charged for similar services.'"
135 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(A).
136 Id. § 254(b)(3).
137 Report and Order, supra note 5, 608.
'38 In re Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 11,111, 1 (Sept.
26, 2006) (establishing a pilot program to "examine how the rural health care (RHC) fund-
ing mechanism can be used to enhance public and non-profit health care providers' access to
advanced telecommunications and information services").
139 Id.
140 Telehealth is defined as "a broad set of applications using communications technolo-
gies to support long-distance clinical care, consumer and professional health-related educa-
tion, public health, health administration, research, and electronic health records." Id. at
11,111 n.2.
141 Id. l.
142 Report and Order, supra note 5, 424.
143 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B) (2000).
144 Id. The high-cost and rural healthcare programs are not intended to provide dis-
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Eligible schools and libraries can receive anywhere from twenty to ninety
percent discounts on telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal
connections.'45 Funding for the school and library support mechanism is
capped at $2.25 billion annually."
5. Contribution Methodology
Contribution to USF falls primarily on consumers. While Congress man-
dated that interstate telecommunications providers contribute to the fund, this
contribution is typically passed on to consumers in the form of a line item on
their monthly bill.'47 In theory, passing the cost onto consumers creates con-
sumption distortions because the tax alters the price consumers pay; at higher
prices, consumers consume less.'
The Commission's rules require that "[e]ntities that provide interstate tele-
communications to the public ... for a fee" contribute to USF. "'49 Each quarter
the Commission establishes a contribution factor-the percentage of a pro-
vider's projected interstate end-user revenue that must be contributed to
USF.'° The contribution factor is based on "the ratio of total projected quar-
terly expenses of the universal service support mechanisms to the total pro-
jected collected end-user interstate and international telecommunications reve-
nues, net of projected contributions.""' The Commission receives the total pro-
jected USF outlays for the quarter from the Universal Service Administrative
Company, which is responsible for administering the fund."'52 That number is
then divided by projected end-user interstate and international revenue, exclud-
ing any expected support from USF. The quotient is the contribution factor.
counted services to consumers or healthcare providers. Rather, the intention is to provide
parity for such consumers between urban and rural geographies. See Report and Order,
supra note 5, 424. The Commission explains that the legislative history of the 1996 Act
evidenced Congress's intent to provide affordable access, not just reasonably comparable
rates, for schools and libraries. Id.
145 HAZLETT, supra note 63, at 22.
146 Report and Order, supra note 5, 529.
147 FCC UNIVERSAL SERVICE FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 1.
148 See supra Part IL.A (explaining that consumption distortions are created when con-
sumers pay inflated prices for goods or services and consume less than they would at lower
prices).
149 47 C.F.R. § 54.706(a) (2006); see also Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC,
183 F.3d 393, 424 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Commission's authority to impose car-
rier contribution to the Fund extended only to interstate services).
150 47 C.F.R. § 54.709(a)(2).
'51 Id.




The contribution factor has increased from an annual average of 6.85% of in-
terstate revenue in 2001 to 10.7% in 2007.'3
V. THE CURRENT FAILURES OF THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND:
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT HIGH-COST
FUND MECHANISM AND CONTRIBUTION METHODOLOGY
Total USF outlays for 2006 amounted to over $6.6 billion.'54 High-cost sup-
port for 2006 amounted to approximately $4.1 billion, or 61.8% of the total
support distributed under USF.' 55 Further, high- cost fund support has grown
by approximately $1.5 billion since 200 1.116 The growth of high-cost USF sup-
port can be attributed to two factors: the means of distributing the support, and
the growth in demand for support.
The rising level of high-cost support has strained the contribution methodol-
ogy, ultimately leading to higher contributions per consumer and increased
distortions in consumer choice. The average contribution factor for 2006 was
almost four percent higher than that in 2001.157 The contribution factor reached
11.7% in the second quarter of 2007, "the highest level since its inception."'
5 8
Continuing to raise the contribution factor to fund universal service is a short-
term, politically feasible solution that increases distortions in consumer
choices.'59 Long-term viability of universal service is dependant upon a contri-
bution methodology that decreases the distorting effect on consumers by re-
ducing the demand for support and minimizing the amount each consumer
must pay.
153 See id.
154 Universal Service Monitoring Report, supra note 18, at 1-36 tbl. 1.11.
155 Id. Low income support amounted to 12.4%; schools and libraries support was
25.2%; and rural healthcare support amounted to 0.6% of total USF support distributed. Id.
156 Id. at 3-14 tbl.3.1.
157 See FCC, Universal Service Fund Contribution Factor & Quarterly Filings, supra
note 21.
158 Recommended Decision, supra note 20, at 9000 n. 11.
159 Allowing an increased contribution factor to fund universal service is politically fea-
sible because the contribution factor is dependant on demand for support. Therefore, to the
extent that it is not transparent to consumers that the amount of the tax has increased, and
that the increase is due to an increase in demand for support, policymakers can continue to
fund the system in the short-term. Further, the status quo benefits rural service providers
who are therefore unlikely to seek reform in the face of growing contribution factors. See
HAZLETIr, supra note 63, at 96-97 (explaining that when the current USF mechanism, rural
telephone companies receive as much as one-third of their revenue from USF).
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A. The Methods for Determining High-Cost Support
The methods for determining support under the high-cost fund have directly
affected the growth of the fund. The amount of support a provider receives is
dependant upon embedded costs, forward-looking economic costs, or identical
support. 6 ' These methods are all, to some extent, derivative of costs, particu-
larly support distributed to rural-carriers through embedded costs.
As previously stated, embedded costs are "a carrier's historic loop or switch-
ing costs.""' Because higher costs lead to more support, it is rational for rural
carriers not to minimize costs. The Commission noted in its Report and Order
that "[t]he use of embedded costs would discourage prudent investment plan-
ning because carriers could receive support for inefficient as well as efficient
investments."'62 The Commission also concluded that "support based on em-
bedded cost could jeopardize the provision of universal service."'63 Further, the
Commission agreed with The Center for Public Integrity's comment that "the
use of embedded costs to calculate universal service support would lead to
subsidization of inefficient carriers at the expense of efficient carriers and
could create disincentives for carriers to operate efficiently."'"
Arguably, much of the inefficiency in support under embedded costs arises
from inflated corporate overhead costs.'6 5 Non-rural carriers, who receive sup-
port based on forward-looking economic costs, have annual corporate expenses
averaging approximately $75 per line.'66 Rural carriers, on the other hand, have
annual corporate expenses averaging approximately $99 per line.'67
This argument is validated in part by the dividends distributed to members
of rural cooperative phone companies. 6 The high-cost fund is meant to facili-
tate deployment in rural and high-cost areas by compensating providers for the
160 See supra Part IV.B.5.
161 Report and Order, supra note 5, at 8900 n.580.
162 Id. 1 228. Further, the Joint Board explained "that when embedded costs are above
forward-looking costs, support of embedded costs would direct carriers to make inefficient
investments that may not be financially viable when there is competitive entry." Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 HAZLETT, supra note 63, at 31.
166 Id. at 30.
167 Id. at 31. This figure may be questioned on the grounds that carriers serving more
lines have achieved greater economies of scale, and the marginal cost in managerial ex-
penses is significantly lower for carriers serving more lines. However, Hazlett explains that
"[t]here does not seem to be a trend, meaning that larger carriers (serving more lines) do not
have appreciably lower costs than smaller carriers." Id. at 30. Hazlett claims this result is
due to the effect of competitive markets, which eliminate inefficiencies. Id. Carriers serving
more lines do not have lower overhead because they serve more lines, but because competi-
tion has forced them to be efficient, and cutting overhead costs, in part, helps achieve effi-
ciency.
168 Jdat 36, 70.
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increased expense of deploying in such areas, not to subsidize the consumers
cost of service.'69 Some rural co-operative telephone companies receiving high-
cost support, however, have been able to provide dividends to their members
above what their members are paying for service. 7 ° Despite the failure of the
high-cost fund support to rural carriers to encourage efficient operation, rural
high-cost support is still determined by embedded costs. Further exacerbating
the ineffectiveness of the high-cost mechanism to force cost savings is the
manner in which competitors receive support-the identical support rule.
Under the identical support rule, competitive ETCs receive high-cost sup-
port at the same per line level as the incumbent.' 7 ' Wireless providers make up
a majority of all competitive ETCs.' It may be argued that the identical sup-
port rule was intended to stimulate competition. In practice, if a provider is
able to offer service in a high-cost area at a lower cost than the incumbent, the
opportunity for a high return on investment exists and competitors will enter
the market. Competitive ETC support, if used as a measurement of competi-
tion, shows a drastic increase in competition. High cost support for competitive
ETCs has grown from $15 million in 2001 to almost $1 billion in 2006. "' The
rapid growth of competitive ETC support over the last half decade tracks the
growth in wireless phone adoption.'74
'69 See Report and Order, supra note 5, 199. Federal universal service support to rural,
insular and high-cost areas will be provided "to a particular customer" calculated by the
"cost of constructing and operating the network facilities and functions used to provide that
service." Id.
170 HAZLETr, supra note 63, at 36, 70. Hazlett cites as an example, XIT, a rural telephone
cooperative in Texas. In 2003, XIT paid "its members a dividend averaging $375-
substantially more than the $206 the typical member paid for local voice access." Id. at 36.
Hazlett further explains that XIT is "one of at least four Texas co-ops that have paid divi-
dends equal to, or exceeding, their members' local pone bills since 1999 . Id. at 36
n.79.
'7' 47 C.F.R. § 54.307(a)(1) (2006).
172 See In re High-Cost Universal Service Support; Federal-State Joint Board on Univer-
sal Service, Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association®, WC Docket No. 05-337, CC
Docket No. 96-45, 3-4 (June 6, 2007) (accessible via the Electronic Comment Filing Sys-
tem) [hereinafter CTIA Comment] (arguing that from 2002 to 2007, "annual high-cost uni-
versal service support for wireless ETCs has increased to about $1 billion"). Total outlays
for competitive ETCs in 2006 were approximately $1 billion. Recommended Decision, su-
pra note 20, 4. Therefore, it follows that wireless providers make up a majority of com-
petitive ETCs.
17' Recommended Decision, supra note 20, 4.
174 See CTIA Comment, supra note 172, at 3. Wireless subscribers have grown "from
118 million in June 2001 to more than 233 million in December 2006." Id. at 4. CTIA ar-
gues that consumers demand wireless services, and instead of trying to manage competitive
ETC growth, the "Commission instead should be asking why incumbent LECs continue to
receive the lion's share of high-cost funding, even while wireless carriers serve more lines,
carry more minutes ..... Id. at 4-5.
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Wireless networks are generally less expensive to deploy and maintain than
wireline networks.'75 The identical support rule, however, allows wireless
ETCs to receive support at the same per-line level as the incumbent LEC. '76 As
a result, wireless ETCs are essentially receiving a higher rate of return on their
network investments than incumbent wireline ETCs at the expense of consum-
ers.'77 This result may have a perverse disincentive for wireline incumbents to
update their networks, as their support would increase, the competitive advan-
tage of wireless ETCs would also increase.
Reform must remove this disincentive by forcing all supported providers to
seek the lowest level of support necessary. Ideally, this will minimize the an-
nual outlays for high-cost support, thereby reducing the actual cost to consum-
ers and consumption distortions caused by USF.
B. Contribution Methodology
The current contribution methodology struggles under increased demand for
support driven by the high-cost fund.'78 As previously stated, the contribution
factor has increased dramatically since 2001.' This arises from a disparity in
the rate of growth in the contribution base and the increase in demand for sup-
port. For instance, from 2001 to 2006 the contribution base remained relatively
flat, decreasing slightly from approximately $80 billion in 2001 to approxi-
mately $79 billion in 2006.8 Over the same period, total USF outlays' 8 ' have
175 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service Seeks Comment on the
Long Term, Comprehensive High-Cost Universal Service Reform, National Telecommuni-
cations Cooperative Association Initial Comments, WC Docket No. 05-337, CC Docket No.
96-45, 12 (May 31, 2007) (accessible via the Electronic Comment Filing System) [hereinaf-
ter NTCA Comment]. NTCA argues that the identical support rule can allow "a large wire-
less CETC to receive rural support even if it can be extremely profitable in rural markets
without support." Id. at 19.
176 See 47 C.F.R. 54.307(a) (2006).
177 See CTIA Comment, supra note 172, at 20 (arguing that when a wireless competitive
ETC receives support under the identical support rule, the support is likely a windfall). An
extreme example of the identical support rule in practice is illustrated by the Sandwich Isles
Communications Company in Hawaii, which serves 1,238 customers using wireline tech-
nology and receives $13,345 per line per year in support. Sprint/Nextel provides wireless
service in the area and qualifies for high-cost support at the same per line level for their 717
subscribers. Hazlett, supra note 63, at 20.
178 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 2 (citing the high-cost fund as one reason that
spending on USF programs has increased; and acknowledging that increasing demand for
support has had a greater impact on the growth of the contribution factor than a declining
base for support).
179 See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
180 Universal Service Monitoring Report, supra note 18, at 1-13 tbl. 1.1. The contribution
base is derived from telecommunications providers' interstate and international end user
revenue. 47 C.F.R. § 54.709(a)(2) (2006).
18! Multiplying the contribution base by the contribution factor for a given period yields
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increased from approximately $4.9 billion 82 to approximately $6.6 billion.'83
The contribution factor must make up the difference-a shortfall of over $1.5
billion.
The subsequent price increases for long distance, wireless, and VoIP ser-
vices have an inversely proportional effect on the consumption of such ser-
vices."'4 An increase in the contribution factor increases costs to consumers in
real terms (the price paid for a service) and in costs generated from an increase
in distortion of consumption decisions.'85 The total cost to consumers of main-
taining the high-cost fund is estimated to be approximately $4.1 billion or as
much as $30 per consumer annually.'86
Contribution methodology reform must focus on decreasing the distorting
effects on consumption. Inherent in decreasing this effect is decreasing the cost
per consumer of maintaining universal service. This is achieved by reforming
the contribution methodology and the high-cost fund.
VI. LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: MITIGATING THE POLITICAL
FEASIBILITY OF REFORM TO EFFECTUATE CHANGE
To remedy the failures of the current high-cost mechanism and contribution
methodology, Congress should adopt two principles within which high-cost
and contribution reform should occur. The principles avoid the implicit princi-
ple-agent problem facing both Congress and the Commission. Congress can
adopt these general principles without upsetting the balance of constituent in-
terests, and the Commission would be acting under the guidance of Congress.
In a manner similar to the 1996 Act, Congress can adopt the general principles
and require the Commission to enact the specific reform. To ensure timely
adoption of reform, Congress should force the Commission to issue a rulemak-
ing and adopt an order within a specific time frame. Further, Congress must
the outlays for that period.
82 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 4 tbl. 1-1.
183 Universal Service Monitoring Report, supra note 18, at 1-36 tbl. 1.11.
184 The inverse relationship is due to the economic principle of supply and demand. As
the price of a good increases above an equilibrium, the demand for that good decreases. The
distortion is equal to the difference between demand at the price without the tax and demand
with the tax. The cost in real terms is the line item on consumers' bills. See supra Part II.A.
185 See supra Part II.A.
186 See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 41, at 119. This estimate represents the net
welfare loss of middle and upper income households. Crandall and Waverman discuss the
welfare loss and gains in terms of household incomes because they provide estimates based
on the goals of USF of providing telephone service to everyone, and income redistribution.
See id. While this Comment does not explicitly argue that USF operates as a form of income
redistribution, based on Crandall and Waverman's estimates of $4.1 billion in welfare loss
of middle and upper income households to generate a gain of only $435 million per year for
lower income households, the theory appears to have some validity.
[Vol. 16
Universal Service Reform
require that reforms meet both of these principles. To do so, Congress may
have to allow the Commission to act under the proposed principles in a manner
inconsistent with the existing seven principles of section 254. While the prin-
ciples in section 254 should be met, certain reforms should not be disregarded
for failing to meet one, or maybe several of the principles.
The principles address the failures of the high-cost mechanism and contribu-
tion methodology at a high level.'87 The principles strive to achieve a contribu-
tion methodology that reduces the distorting effects of funding USF while si-
multaneously reducing the overall cost of the high-cost fund. Distortions in
consumption decisions are sought to be minimized by adoption of a support
mechanism that encourages efficiency and a contribution methodology that
distributes the burden across the largest number of consumers. The principles
are developed in turn below, and applied to current reform proposals to exhibit
the principles' functionality.
A. High Cost Support Reform Principle
In order to manage the costs of providing high-cost universal service, sup-
port must be distributed in a manner that encourages carriers to seek and use
support efficiently. To encourage efficient use of support, Congress should
adopt a principle similar to the following:
The Commission, in consultation with the Joint Board, shall adopt a mechanism for
determining support for services in high-cost, rural, and insular areas that distributes
the minimum support necessary for the provision, maintenance, or upgrading of facili-
ties. The Commission shall require every eligible provider seeking support under this
mechanism to submit projected costs for the period in which they are seeking support.
Under this principle, the current forward-looking economic cost model and
embedded cost mechanism for determining support cannot exist. Both high-
cost support mechanisms in their present form do not encourage providers to
seek the minimum support necessary for the provision of service. In fact, the
opposite is true.'88 Further, any mechanism created under this principle would
necessarily eliminate the identical support rule because each provider would be
required to prove their own costs.'89
Although the Commission must still adopt the specific mechanism under
this principle, the principle ensures that such a mechanism must minimize the
187 There are many individual components of the high-cost fund that could be reformed
at the micro level, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Some of these individual com-
ponents include narrowly targeting support, disaggregating support and altering the services
supported, among others. See 2007 Public Notice, supra note 19, 1.
188 See supra Part V.A for a discussion of the disincentive for recipients of high-cost
support.
189 For a discussion of the identical support rule, see supra Part V.A.
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amount of support necessary. 9 ° Theoretically, a mechanism established under
this principle would ultimately decrease the burden on consumers by reducing
the overall demand for support. Further, because the principle is general in na-
ture and does not explicitly injure the economic interest of any constituency, it
allows legislators to effectuate reform without seriously alienating their con-
stituencies. ''
In the current debate over high-cost USF reform, competitive bidding ap-
pears as a widely discussed method of encouraging efficiency in the system.
Competitive bidding in this context generally takes the form of a reverse auc-
tion. 92 Reverse auctions for USF support "contemplate competitive bidding for
the obligation to serve a specified area at an acceptable quality of service for a
specified term, with the benefit of receiving ... support to do so.""' In its Re-
port and Order, the Commission agreed with the Joint Board that there are
benefits to competitive bidding, such as "its potential as a market-based ap-
proach to determining universal service support, if any, for any given area."'94
Nonetheless, because the record was not sufficient to determine what form the
competitive bidding mechanism should take, and because the Commission
feared that there was insufficient competition in rural areas to effectuate such a
mechanism, the Commission deferred consideration of the use of competitive
bidding. "'
In 2006, the Joint Board sought comment on the merits of a reverse auction
mechanism for determining high-cost support.'96 After consideration of the
2006 comments, the Joint Board sought comment on three specific reverse
auction proposals:'97 CTIA-The Wireless Association's proposal, 98 Verizon's
190 In implementing reform under this principle the Commission would have to develop a
support mechanism that encourages those providers seeking support to operate efficiently
without having to bear the burden of increased oversight and administrative cost. Otherwise,
the cost savings may be lost.
191 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
192 Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service Seeks Comment on the Merits of
Using Auctions to Determine High-Cost Universal Service Support, Public Notice, 21
F.C.C.R. 9292, at 9292 n. I (Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Public Notice]. The Joint
Board uses the phrases "competitive bidding" and "reverse auction" interchangeably to refer
to "any market process in which the identities of the buyers or sellers and the price and other
terms of trade are determined by an explicit comparison of bids or offers." Id.
193 Id. 4.
194 Report and Order, supra note 5, 320.
195 Id. 321,324.
196 Id. l.
197 2007 Public Notice, supra note 19, 4. The Joint Board also invited commenters "to
file additional auction proposals . . . related to using reverse auctions to calculate and dis-
tribute high cost support." Id.
198 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; High-Cost Universal Service
Support, Reply Comments of CTIA - The Wireless Association, WC Docket No. 05-337, CC
Docket No. 96-45 (Nov. 8, 2006) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
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proposal,'99 and Alltel's proposal."' Each proposal differs in the specifics, but
all require providers seeking high-cost support to prove their costs to the Com-
mission, with the lowest "bid" receiving support.2"' Therefore, if two providers
seek support from the high cost fund, the provider seeking the lowest level of
support wins.
A reverse auction would take significant strides towards decreasing costs by
requiring competitors to bid down their demand for high cost support, as re-
quired by the principle. However, the reverse auction mechanism also has its
downfalls.
First, while a reverse auction mechanism may encourage lower costs when
there is a competitor, it does not encourage any cost savings when there is only
one provider in a given area. Any reverse auction mechanism adopted under
the principle must make accommodation for areas with one provider, and may
ensure the provider does not receive support based on embedded costs or for-
ward-looking economic costs.
Second, a reverse auction may not satisfy the competitive neutrality princi-
ple adopted under section 254.202 Given that wireless carriers have lower costs
of deployment and maintenance than wireline providers, it is likely that, under
a strict reverse auction, wireless providers will have a significant advantage
over wireline providers. Therefore, on its face, the mechanism is not competi-
tively neutral. Inconsistency with this principle of section 254 would have to
be reconciled before a mechanism could be adopted under the new principle.
As proposed above, Congress could draft the principle such that a reform meet-
ing the proposed principles is preferred even if it violates a principle of section
254.
B. Contribution Methodology
Effective reform of the USF contribution methodology should seek to
minimize the distortion caused by consumers funding USF. A contribution
methodology that limits distortion is one that limits the size of the distorting
199 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; High-Cost Universal Service
Support, Reply Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless, WC Docket No. 05-337, CC
Docket No. 96-45 (Nov. 8, 2006) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
200 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; High-Cost Universal Service
Support, Alltel Comments, WC Docket No. 05-337, CC Docket No. 96-45 (Oct. 10, 2006)
(accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
201 Some proposals allow for the slightly higher cost providers to receive support at a
lower amount than the "winner."
202 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(7) (2000); see also Report and Order, supra note 6, 47-48
(adopting competitive neutrality under the authority of section 254).
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cost and spreads the cost over the greatest number of consumers." 3 To achieve
this, Congress should adopt a principle similar to the following:
The Commission, in consultation with the Joint Board, shall require contribution to
the Universal Service Fund in a manner that is technologically neutral. The contribu-
tion methodology must distribute the burden of funding universal service across the
broadest feasible base of possible contributors; take into account the multiplicity of
services subscribed to by any one consumer; and limit the possibility of multiple con-
tributions.
This principle should implement a contribution methodology that spreads
the burden across a broad base, while attempting to eliminate multiple contri-
butions by any one consumer. The overall burden will, in theory, be lower due
to a larger base of contributors. A lower burden per consumer corresponds to a
lower consumption distortion created by the tax."°
This principle recognizes that many consumers subscribe to multiple ser-
vices that may be required to contribute under this principle, including long-
distance telephone service, wireless telephone service, VoIP, and possibly
broadband Internet service. In the event that a contribution methodology re-
quired all of these services to contribute, the tax may discourage consumers
from adopting a particular service. The second clause considers this possibility,
requiring that the Commission consider such an effect in the creation of a con-
tribution methodology under this principle.
In its report on universal service funding, CBO cites three possible contri-
bution reform proposals, including a numbers-based approach." 5 A numbers-
based approach to contribution reform seeks to spread the burden of funding
universal service across the broadest base of consumers possible. Generally,
under this approach a fee would be levied on a provider for each telephone
number assigned to a customer.0 6 A "pure" numbers-based proposal would be
technologically neutral-applying the tax across all communications technolo-
gies including landline, wireless, cable telephony, and interconnected VoIP.2 7
It is estimated that there are over 524 million telephone numbers eligible for
contribution under this proposal.200 With total USF outlays from 2006 at $6.6
203 See PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 35 (identifying five considera-
tions in achieving a "lower social cost for raising a given amount of tax revenue:" broaden-
ing the base of tax payers; levying the tax on a good with an inelastic demand; adopting a
technologically neutral tax; levying taxes on final goods; and adopting a transparent taxing
mechanism).
204 See supra Part II.A (discussing the balance of costs and benefits).
205 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 13-15. The other two proposals seek to
broaden the contribution base, or establish "fees based on the capacity of telephone lines."
Id.
206 Id.
207 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 2, at 36.
208 Id. (excluding low-income households).
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billion,2°9 a numbers-based tax would result in a contribution of approximately
$12.58 per number per year. As compared to the estimated $30 per consumer
under the current mechanism, the numbers-based reform proposal would result
in significant cost savings, especially when coupled with high-cost reform that
limits the overall size of the fund.20
Although a numbers-based proposal does not account for the multiplicity of
services subscribed to by any one consumer, the Commission need only take
into consideration the multiple services subscribed to by any consumer. If the
Commission initiated a rulemaking to determine the effect of taxing consumers
for multiple services and found that effect to be de minimis, a pure numbers-
based proposal would satisfy the contribution principle.
Taken in combination, the proposed principles should guide the Commis-
sion in crafting significant universal service reform that limits the distorting
effects of supporting the system by decreasing demand for support and dispers-
ing the cost of support. The principles represent a politically feasible solution
to significant universal service reform.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current high-cost universal service fund mechanism and contribution
methodology have led to significant increases in the USF and distortion in con-
sumption decisions. Reform is hindered by policymakers' inability to rectify
the growing need for reform with the political feasibility of reform. To mitigate
the constraints prohibiting reform, legislators should adopt principles that re-
quire the Commission to create a high-cost support mechanism that encourages
cost savings, and a contribution methodology that limits distortions in con-
sumption decisions.
209 Universal Service Monitoring Report, supra note 18, at 1-36 tbl. 1.11.
210 See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 41, at 119.
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